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Governments of Europe that it was possible to protect the bourgeois State against
the danger of a Communist insurrection.
In two of the most fully policed and best organized countries in Europe,
i.e., Holland and Switzerland, where law and order are not merely the products
of bureaucratic and politica1 machinery but a natural characteristic of the people,
the difficulty of applying the Communist tactics of insurrection would be no
greater than it was in the Russia of Kerenski. On what grounds can such a
paradox be stated? It is because the problem of the modern coup d Etat is a
technical problem. Insurrection is an engine, said Trotsky: technical experts
are needed to start it and they alone can turn it off. The starting of the engine is
independent of the country s political, social or economic situation. Not the
masses make a revolution, but a mere handful of men, prepared for any
emergency , well drilled in the tactics of insurrection, trained to strike hard and
quickly at the vital organs , of the State s technical services. These shock troops
should be recruited from among specialized workmen : mechanics, electricians,
telegraph and radio operators acting under orders of technica1 engineers who
understand the technical working of the State.
At one of the Comintern meetings in 1923, Radek suggested that in every
European country a special corps should be trained in the art of capturing the
State. He held that a thousand men, well drilled and trained, would be able to
seize power in any European country, be it France, England, Germany,
Switzerland, or Spain. Radek suspected the revolutionary quality of Communists
in other countries. In his criticism of the men and methods of the Third
International, he does not even spare the memory of Rosa Luxembourg or of
Liebknecht. Radek was the only one who fought the widespread optimism that
reigned in 1920, while Trotsky was engaged in his offensive against Poland. The
Red Army was getting nearer the Vistula and the news of the fall of Warsaw was
expected in the Kremlin at any moment. Trotsky s success largely depended on
the support of Polish Communists. Lenin blindly and confidently expected a
proletarian revolution to break out in Warsaw as soon as the Red soldiers had
reached the Vistula. Radek said, The Polish Communists cannot be relied upon.
They are Communists but not revolutionaries. Shortly afterwards Lenin said to
Clara Zetkin, Radek foresaw what would happen. He warned us. I was very
angry with him and treated him as a defeatist. But he was right, not I. He knows
the situation outside of Russia, and especially in the West, better than we do.
Radek s proposal roused the opposition of Lenin and all the members of
the Comintern. Lenin said: If we want to help foreign Communists to seize
power in their countries, we must try to create a situation in Europe that bears
comparison with the condition of Russia in 1917. Lenin was remaining true to
his idea of strategy and forgot the lesson taught by Polish events. Trotsky alone
approved of Radek s proposal. He even went so far as to show the need for a
Technical Instruction school in Moscow for Communists who would afterwards
form the core of a special corps in each country to seize power. Hitler has
recently revived this idea and is at present organizing a similar school in Munich
for his shock troops. If I can have a troop of men, a thousand strong, recruited
among Berlin workmen and fortified by Russian Communists, said Trotsky, I
will undertake to get control of Berlin within twenty-four hours. He never
relied on the enthusiasm of the people or on the participation of the masses in an
insurrection. The intervention of the masses may be useful, he said, but only
in the second instance when the counter-offensive of the counter-revolutionaries
has to be repulsed. He also said that Communists in Germany would always be
defeated by the Schutzpolizei (State police) and by the Reichwehr (army) if they
postponed the application of the tactics of October 1917. Trotsky and Radek had
actually decided on a plan for the Berlin coup d Etat. And, when Trotsky was in
the German capital in May 1926 for an operation on his throat, he was accused of
coming to Berlin for the purpose of organizing a Communist rebellion. But by
1926 he had already lost interest in European revolutions. The news of the
General Strike in England and of Pilsudski s coup d Etat in Poland made him
feverish and hastened his return to Moscow. It was the same fever that possessed
him in those great October days, when he was turned into a live wire, as
Lunacharski put it. Meanwhile, Trotsky returned to Moscow, pale and feverish,
to organize the shock troops for the overthrow of Stalin and for the capture of the
State.
Stalin however knew how to turn the lesson of October 1917 to good
account. With the help of Menjinski, the new Chief of the G.P.U., he organized a
special corps for the defense of the State. The headquarters of this special corps
were in the Lubianka Palace, the home of the G.P.U. Menjinski personally
supervised the choice of his Communist recruits from the workers in the State s
Public Services, among railwaymen, mechanics, electricians, and telegraphists.
Their only weapons were hand grenades and revolvers so that they might move
about quickly. The special Corps consisted of a hundred squads of ten men each,
reinforced by twenty armored cars. Each detachment was provided with a half-
company of machine-gunners: communications between the various squads and
the Lubianka headquarters were kept open by dispatch riders. Menjinski took
complete charge of the whole organization and divided Moscow into ten sectors.
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