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largely dependent on their SED sources) and Yet the Sokolovskii-Semyenov-Yudin were becoming a broad movement among
the politburo suspected that the popular up- report, written only a few days after the the entire population. 40
rising was a counter-revolutionary coup height of the demonstrations, reveals that RIAS cautious policy during the upris-
inspired by the West. Ulbricht had announced the Soviet representatives realized that the ing was indicative of the overall response by
the line in his speech before the Parteiaktiv SED s policy of accelerating the construc- the Eisenhower Administration. At a meet-
on the night of June 16, and certainly the tion of Socialism as adopted at the Second ing of the National Security Council on June
almost parallel flaring up of riots and dem- Party Conference and the ensuing supply 18, CIA director Allen W. Dulles pointed
onstrations throughout the country tended to shortages had caused growing dissatisfac- out that, the United States had nothing
create the impression (or confirm SED-lead- tion among the working middle class and whatsoever to do with inciting these riots. 41
ers in their ideological preconceptions) that constituted the prime causes of the disor- While acknowledging that the brutal sup-
this could only be a systematically prepared ders. Even the SED report acknowledged, pression of the popular uprising by Soviet
action by the West. There is evidence that in conformity with the New Course, that military might afforded the United States an
Semyenov and Marshall Sokolovskii, Chair- dissatisfaction among the population had excellent propaganda opportunity 42 and
man of the Soviet Chiefs of Staff and deputy resulted from the mistakes of Party and could be viewed as a sign of real promise,
defense minister who had been sent to the Government. the Eisenhower Administration initially took
Soviet army headquarters in Karlshorst on No evidence, indeed, has so far emerged no steps to escalate the crisis. Faced with
June 17, accepted (and passed on to Mos- which would support the allegation of West- disappointment and resentment throughout
cow) GDR Interior Ministry reports which ern instigation of the uprising. Contrary to Germany about the weak western response,
alleged a very active organizational role of the Eisenhower Administration s roll-back the U.S. government later, in July and Au-
the American military in the disorders in rhetoric and its interest in psychological gust, initiated a large western aid program
Berlin. As Semyenov and Sokolovskii put warfare, neither the United States nor any which exacerbated tensions in the GDR and
it in a June 19 cable to Moscow, [t]he other western government was prepared for displayed Western sympathy for the plight
people arrested testify that American offic- or actively working toward an uprising in of the East Germans.43 The uprising, an
ers personally selected and gathered resi- East Germany or a major intervention be- internal U.S. government memorandum later
dents of West Berlin in large groups and hind the Iron Curtain. Although the Ameri- judged, began as spontaneous manifesta-
gave them instructions to organize disorders can radio station in Berlin, Radio In the tions of dissatisfaction... [I]t is generally
in East Berlin, the arson of buildings etc. As American Sector (RIAS), was waging an agreed that the American-controlled radio
a reward, the American officers promised effective propaganda campaign against the station RIAS played an important role in
money, and for the people who were the SED regime and was later credited with spreading the riots from East Berlin into the
most active a three month vacation in a helping to spread the uprising from East zone and that these riots were then further
vacation home, etc. American military people Berlin throughout the country, U.S. officials stimulated by the American food pro-
16 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN
gram. 44 deaf ears. Consequently, Sokolovskii, limited to June 17 or to East Berlin.46
Charges of Western involvement not- Semyenov, and Yudin recommended to re-
withstanding, within the SED the party po- lieve comr. Ulbricht of his duties as deputy
1. The report is located in the Archive of Foreign Policy
of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; it was
litburo, and especially Ulbricht, were widely prime minister of the GDR and to liquidate
obtained by Vladislav M. Zubok of the National Secu-
blamed for misreading the depth of the the currently existing position of General
rity Archive and translated by Danny Rozas. The
crisis and the popular reaction to the policy Secretary of the CC SED, replacing it with
archival reference is Fund 06, Opis 12a, Papka 51, Delo
of the Construction of Socialism. The several CC secretariat posts.
301, Listy 1-51.
2. Marshall V.D. Sokolovskii, since 1949 Chief of the
self-criticism and the climate of openness Developments within the SED polit-
Soviet General Staff and since 1952 Deputy Defense
which accompanied the SED espousal of buro came to a head on July 8 when the final
Minister, had arrived in Berlin at the height of the June
the New Course and which had many East draft commission report was considered. By
1953 crisis.
Germans demanding the resignation of the now, politburo members Heinrich Rau, Elli
3. Vladimir Semyonovich Semyenov, since 1946 Po-
litical Adviser to the Soviet Military Administration in
government, also inspired challenges to Schmidt, Ackermann and East Berlin mayor
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